A simple model in which an animal makes a choice between two simultaneously available foraging options is used to show that we cannot expect natural selection to assign an absolute value (based on ¢tness) to each option. The example shows that the value of an option depends on its context; in particular, it depends on the option with which it is paired. This dependence results in a pattern of choice that violates a stochastic form of transitivity.
I N T RO DUC T ION
There is widespread belief that evolution by natural selection results in animals choosing between options in such a way as to maximize ¢tness. It is tempting, but incorrect, to go from this view of natural selection to the conclusion that natural selection assigns an absolute value (based on ¢tness) to each option that an animal can perform. As McNamara & Houston (1986) emphasize, the value of an action depends on the actions that are subsequently performed. It follows that the value of an action cannot be considered without specifying future behaviour.
To illustrate the implications of the dependence of value on future actions, I present an analysis of the behaviour of a forager that can choose between simultaneously available food items. The model is based on the procedure used by Sha¢r (1994) to investigate the behaviour of honey bees (Apis mellifera). Sha¢r found that the bees' choices were not always transitive. (Roughly speaking, choice is transitive if a is preferred to b and b is preferred to c then a is preferred to c. A precise de¢nition in the context of stochastic choice is given below.) Sha¢r takes the bees' intransitive choices to be support for a decision procedure in which an option is evaluated by comparing it to another option rather than by assigning an option an absolute value. Sha¢r refers to this as a`comparative' evaluation. I show that violations of transitivity are, under some circumstances, a possible consequence of adaptive decisions. The basis of the result is that the contribution that an action makes to an animal's reproductive success depends on the context in which it occurs. In essence, comparative evaluations are likely to evolve. For simplicity, I assume that ¢tness is maximized by maximizing energetic gain, but the fundamental conclusion about context dependence is not restricted to this situation.
. S I M U LTA N E OU S C HO IC E W I T H NO E R ROR S
I consider a forager that is confronted at some time t with a choice between two options. Under option i (i 1,2) the forager obtains an amount of energy e i but has to spend a handling time h i before it can resume foraging. After the handling time is over, the animal can forage at rate until time T. If the animal is to maximize the energy that it has obtained by this time, then we can ¢nd the best choice by considering
where H i is a measure of the pay-o¡ that results from choosing option i. The optimal action is the one with the highest value of H. In the current context, the animal should choose option 1 rather than option 2 if and only if H 1 b H 2 , i.e. if and only if
A striking consequence of inequality (2) is that whether option 1 or 2 is best depends on the rate . Assume that e 1 b e 2 and h 1 b h 2 . Then there is a critical rate e 1 À e 2 h 1 À h 2 , such that option 1 should be chosen if ` , and option 2 should be chosen if b . Switches of this kind are well known in the context of central-place foraging (e.g. Orians & Pearson 1979) , where they are usually presented as a response to changes in the round-trip travel time (. When ( is short, it can be optimal to take a prey type with the smaller e and the smaller h, whereas when ( is long it can be optimal to take the item with the larger e and the larger h. A repetition of the central-place foraging cycle of foraging and returning with a load generates a rate . Because increasing ( decreases , the switch seen in the central-place foraging model is clearly analogous to the case that I have presented.
Although the switch from specializing on one prey type to specializing on the other is well known, I think that its full implications have not been realized. By describing the switch in terms of its dependence on the rate that can be achieved after the choice, it becomes clear that the best thing to do when faced with a choice between options depends on the future. The complete switch in the example presented is a dramatic e¡ect based on changing the future rate . It serves as an introduction to the less dramatic e¡ects that may occur when the future rate is explicitly derived from repeated choices between the options under consideration.
S I M U LTA N E OU S C H OIC E W I T H E R RO R
In the previous section, the rate could be manipulated independently of the animal's choice between two options. I now describe an approach in which the animal makes repeated choices between items. The basic idea is to assume that the animal is selected to maximize its energetic gain, but the decision process is subject to errors. I assume that errors that are costly in terms of energetic gain are less likely than errors that are cheap.
I consider a simultaneous choice procedure in which an animal can choose at time t between the two options introduced above, i.e. option i has energetic content e i and handling time h i . After the animal has ¢nished handling the selected option, a time ( elapses before the choice between the two options is again possible. The analysis of simultaneous choice given above will now be applied to this situation, with the rate after a choice being derived from repeated opportunities for choice. In addition, I will follow McNamara & Houston (1987) in assuming that choice is subject to error, with the probability of error decreasing as its cost increases. Building on the work of Yellott (1977) , McNamara & Houston show that if the probability p i of choosing option i is given by
where H i is the pay-o¡ if option i is chosen (see equation (1)) and is a positive constant, then the model satis¢es both the choice axiom of Luce (1959) and a weaker condition introduced by Yellott. The parameter controls the weight that is given to the pay-o¡ for choosing an action. As decreases, the probability of a suboptimal action being chosen increases. When there are only two options it follows that
and
Equation (4) shows that the probability of choosing an option depends on the di¡erence in the two Hs; this di¡erence is a measure of the cost of choosing one action as opposed to another (cf. McNamara & Houston 1986 , 1987 .
If the animal chooses option i with probability p i (i 1,2), then the resulting rate is p 1 e 1 p 2 e 2 p 1 h 1 p 2 h 2 (
From equations (1) and (4),
We now have an equation for in terms of p 1 and an equation for p 1 in terms of . It is straightforward to solve these simultaneous equations, and hence to ¢nd p 1 .
We are now in a position to investigate whether stochastic transitivity holds in the model with simultaneous choice with errors. Let a,b,c, F F F be possible options. To make the context of choice explicit, let p (a,b) be the probability of choosing a when faced with a choice of a and b. Choice satis¢es strong stochastic transitivity (SST) if 
I follow Houston (1991) in using condition (10) as a test for SST. The condition states that if a and b are equivalent in terms of their probability of being chosen when paired with c, then they should be equally attractive when paired with each other. Rather than carrying out the test with two equivalent options, table 1 gives details of a test that is based on ¢ve equivalent options. These are denoted as option i (i 1, F F F ,5). The standard option (corresponding to option c in the above description) has an energy content of four units and a handling time of two units. For a given value of , the ¢rst two columns give the energy content and handling time of a set of options that are equivalent, in that each one has a probability of 0X2 of being chosen when the other option is the standard option. For example, when 0X5, the probability of choosing option 1 (e 2, h 3X569) when faced with it and the standard option (e 4, h 2) is 0X2, and the probability of choosing option 2 (e 4, h 7X630) when faced with it and the standard option is also 0X2.
If substitutability is to hold then when a forager is faced with these two options, or with any two options from the set of equivalent options, the probability of choosing either option should be 0X5 (see condition (10)). To test this, I present the model with two options from the set of equivalent options. One option is option 1, and the other is option i. The entry on row i gives the probability p (1,i) that option 1 is chosen. For example, when 0X5 the second value of p (1,i) is p(1,2), which is the probability of choosing option 1 (e 2, h 3X569) when faced with a choice between this option and option 2 (e 4, h 7X630). It can be seen that p(1,2) 0X4, i.e. substitutability does not hold. The table also shows that substitutability fails to hold in all the other nontrivial cases considered. It follows from the equivalence of substitutability and strong stochastic transitivity (Tversky & Russo 1969 ) that strong stochastic transitivity does not necessarily hold in this model.
. DI S C U S S ION
I have shown that a simple model of simultaneous choice between foraging options that is subject to errors can result in violations of strong stochastic transitivity. I have also found violations when options are encountered successively. The reason for this result is that the probability of choosing an option depends on the achieved rate of gain, , which in turn depends on the probability of choosing the option. An option does not have a ¢xed value, its value depends on the context of choice which determines .
It is important to note that although the violations depend on errors in decision making, errors alone are not su¤cient to produce violations. We can see this by taking to be ¢xed. Equivalent options have equal Hs in the context of choice against a standard option. When is ¢xed, they also have equal Hs in the context of choice against each other. The importance of errors is that it makes the rate depend on both options available, and hence the Hs depend on context.
The context of choice involves the two options presented at time t being available until some time T, when the amount of energy obtained is assessed. I have made the assumption that the animal is maximizing the energy obtained by T, which gives results that are independent of t and T. This independence will not necessarily hold if some function of the energy obtained by T is maximized (cf. McNamara & Houston 1987) . Sha¢r (1994) suggests that the comparative evaluation of options is suboptimal in that it can produce intransitive choice, whereas an independent evaluation of options will produce transitive choice. Sha¢r goes on to argue that the former choice mechanism may only produce intransitive choices under rare conditions, so that selection against it is weak. I have argued that natural selection on decision making is likely to result in comparative or context-dependent assessment of options. The reason for this is that an option does not make a ¢xed contribution to ¢tness; the contribution depends on subsequent actions, and hence on the context of choice.
Although the result provides a possible explanation of the ¢ndings of Sha¢r (1994) , my main purpose is not to ¢t the data of Sha¢r, but to show that adaptive choice can result in context-dependent values for options. I believe that this is a general conclusion which may be relevant to many aspects of human decision making. For example, the framing e¡ects described by Tversky & Kahneman (1981) , in which decisions depend on how problems are described, might be understandable as a consequence of context-dependent values.
' ' Table 1 . A test of the substitutability condition (condition (10)).
(For each value of , the table gives a set of ¢ve options denoted as option i (i 1, F F F ,5). All members of the set are equivalent, in that they each have the same probability (p 0X2) of being chosen when the other option has an energy of four units and a handling time of two units. 
